The One Belt, One Road initiative offers considerable potential in several economic, political, cultural, and strategic realms; it also presents many uncertainties and potential concerns. It has clearly become a major foreign and economic policy hallmark of the Xi Jinping government and is consistently supported as such by all manner of Chinese observers. While it is generally not depicted as a means of enhancing Beijing’s influence across Eurasia, there is little doubt that it will be measured in large part in those terms, and in its development impact on the region.
In CLM 44, the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road policy initiatives unveiled by Xi Jinping in 2013 were identified as significant elements of Beijing’s current effort to improve ties and stimulate growth and development along its geographic periphery. These initiatives, now termed One Belt, One Road, were seen as part of an overall Chinese attempt to “leverage China’s growing economic power and influence [along its periphery] in order to strengthen and expand cooperative interactions, create an integrated web of mutually beneficial economic, social and political ties, and ultimately lower distrust and enhance a sense of common security.”
While generally cast in positive terms as an effort to build and deepen positive-sum, mutually beneficial development ties, for some non-authoritative Chinese and many nonChinese observers, the One Belt, One Road initiative and other economic policies are also seen as a means of strengthening China’s political influence and security situation along its strategically important periphery. As pointed out, such views and Beijing’s increasing capabilities could deepen concerns in some quarters that China might eventually use the initiative to establish unwelcome spheres of influence or generally dominate its neighbours.
Since its announcement, the One Belt, One Road initiative has steadily gained in importance as a major element of Chinese foreign policy. Indeed, it was presented as the key focus of China’s diplomacy in 2014 and 2015, and as an essential element of Beijing’s attempt to deepen economic reform within China and stimulate development in China’s western regions. It is also now described by many Chinese observers as a highly important “strategy” and not just an economic initiative. According to some outside observers, it is “expected to feature prominently in China’s 13th Five Year Plan, which will run from 2016 to 2020 and guide national investment strategy throughout that period.”
As the apparent significance of the One Belt, One Road initiative has grown, both Chinese and foreign observers have devoted increasing attention to understanding its meaning and relevance not only for Chinese foreign policy and strategy, but also with regard to China’s reform process and its relations with a wide variety of nations along its periphery and beyond. This article takes a closer look at the One Belt, One Road initiative, focusing on how it is viewed by Chinese observers and analysts. In particular, it examines how the Chinese define: (1) the content, scope and relevance of the One Belt, One Road concept, especially within Chinese foreign and (if relevant) defense policies and processes; (2) the intentions behind the concept and its desired consequences for China and others; and (3) the possible challenges and problems involved in implementing the concept and its impact on relations with major powers. As in past CLM pieces, the analysis of Chinese views in these areas will distinguish between authoritative, quasiauthoritative, and non-authoritative Chinese commentary. The article ends with some comments on the Chinese perspective on the One Belt, One Road initiative and its possible implications for overall Chinese foreign policy. The article also comments on some views drawn from secondary Western sources.
As the apparent significance of the One Belt, One Road initiative has grown, both Chinese and foreign observers have devoted increasing attention to understanding its meaning and relevance not only for Chinese foreign policy and strategy, but also with regard to China’s reform process and its relations with a wide variety of nations along its periphery and beyond. This article takes a closer look at the One Belt, One Road initiative, focusing on how it is viewed by Chinese observers and analysts. In particular, it examines how the Chinese define: (1) the content, scope and relevance of the One Belt, One Road concept, especially within Chinese foreign and (if relevant) defense policies and processes; (2) the intentions behind the concept and its desired consequences for China and others; and (3) the possible challenges and problems involved in implementing the concept and its impact on relations with major powers. As in past CLM pieces, the analysis of Chinese views in these areas will distinguish between authoritative, quasiauthoritative, and non-authoritative Chinese commentary. The article ends with some comments on the Chinese perspective on the One Belt, One Road initiative and its possible implications for overall Chinese foreign policy. The article also comments on some views drawn from secondary Western sources.
Quasi- and non-authoritative Chinese sources add that the One Belt, One Road regions include a range of more than 60 emerging market countries and developing countries, with a total population of over 4 billion and an economic aggregate of about $21 trillion, “accounting for about 65 percent and 30 percent of the global totals” in land-based and maritime-based economic production values, respectively.4 Given such statistics and the geographic expanse involved, one quasi-authoritative source, Wu Jianmin—a former president of China’s Foreign Affairs University (attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and a member of the Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of the Chinese Foreign Ministry—describes the One Belt, One Road as “the most significant and far-reaching initiative that China has ever put forward.” The importance of the One Belt, One Road initiative is suggested by the fact that Beijing announced in late March 2015 that it had established “a special leading group to oversee the implementation of the Belt and Road initiatives.” The statement said the leading group would be in charge of “guiding and coordinating work related to the initiative. But it did not specify its members.” The office of the group was placed under the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s top economic planner.
According to authoritative, quasi-authoritative, and non-authoritative Chinese sources, the One Belt, One Road initiative consists of several economic and some non-economic elements. Perhaps the most frequently mentioned economic element is a Chinese commitment to invest heavily in a wide variety of infrastructure projects in order to strengthen the economic capacity and “connectivity” among the nations within the One Belt, One Road area and with China’s western regions. For example, in October 2013 remarks delivered at a conference on China’s diplomacy toward the periphery, Xi Jinping stated that China must “make common efforts with relevant countries to accelerate the pace of infrastructure and connectivity construction [and] build well the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.”
To reinforce the importance of this key element, one non-authoritative source stresses the “rare” high level of complementarity between the critical demand for infrastructure development among the developing countries of the One Belt, One Road regions and “China’s mature and strong infrastructure construction capabilities and financial strength.” The source adds, a little dramatically, that “it is rare for national development strategies to fit together this well. It is almost as if fate had taken opportunities to simultaneously receive capital and engineering capabilities to those countries, while providing new depth to for China to upgrade its development strategy.”8 Authoritative and non-authoritative Chinese sources identify several mechanisms designed entirely or in part to support such infrastructure development, including the Silk Road Fund and the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), as well as Chinese foreign aid and the private capital of both Chinese and foreign business entities.
More broadly, from the perspective of China’s overall development policies, the One Belt, One Road concept is seen by many Chinese sources as a major (indeed, for some, a key) element of the economic reform process itself. Shortly after being announced, the initiative was explicitly linked to Chinese reforms in a decision of the Third Plenum of the 18th CCP CC in November 2013. The decision states: We will set up development-oriented financial institutions, accelerate the construction of infrastructure connecting China with neighboring countries and regions, and work hard to build a Silk Road Economic Belt and a Maritime Silk Road, so as to form a new pattern of all-round opening. The quasi-authoritative source Zhong Sheng describes the One Belt, One Road initiative as “a masterstroke of deepening China’s reform and opening up and furthering peripheral diplomacy.”
Given the scope and significance of the One Belt, One Road initiative, it is not surprising that Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated during the 2015 National People’s Congress that in 2015, “making all-round progress in the Belt and Road initiative” constitutes the “key focus” for Chinese diplomacy.12 Indeed, as one non-authoritative source states, “The fact that a single initiative is taken as the focus of China’s diplomatic work for the whole year shows the weight given to the One Belt, One Road strategy in China’s diplomacy.” Furthermore, both authoritative and quasi-authoritative Chinese sources highlight the importance of the One Belt, One Road initiative by stressing its supposed compatibility with the “purposes and principles of the UN Charter . . . [and] the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.”
The scope and content of the One Belt, One Road initiative is rather breathtaking, and its goals quite ambitious. One authoritative source contends that the initiative should promote five major goals among its constituent nation states: “policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bonds.” This source provides perhaps the most comprehensive overall description of the purpose behind the One Belt, One Road initiative: The initiative to jointly build the Belt and Road, embracing the trend towards a multipolar world, economic globalization, cultural diversity and greater IT application, is designed to uphold the global free trade regime and the open world economy in the spirit of open regional cooperation. It is aimed at promoting orderly and free flow of economic factors, highly efficient allocation of resources and deep integration of markets; encouraging the countries along the Belt and Road to achieve economic policy coordination and carry out broader and more in-depth regional cooperation of higher standards; and jointly creating an open, inclusive and balanced regional economic cooperation architecture that benefits all. […]The Belt and Road Initiative aims to promote the connectivity of Asian, European and African continents and their adjacent seas, establish and strengthen partnerships among the countries along the Belt and Road, set up all-dimensional, multi-tiered and composite connectivity networks, and realize diversified, independent, balanced and sustainable development in these countries. The connectivity projects of the Initiative will help align and coordinate the development strategies of the countries along the Belt and Road, tap market potential in this region, promote investment and consumption, create demands and job opportunities, enhance people-topeople and cultural exchanges, and mutual learning among the peoples of the relevant countries, and enable them to understand, trust and respect each other and live in harmony, peace and prosperity.
One quasi-authoritative source similarly describes the One Belt, One Road initiative as having: [G]reat practical significance for further developing China’s relations with Central Asian nations and for deepening regional cooperation. By strengthening policy communication, road connectivity, trade links, currency circulation, and connections among their peoples, the countries involved can tighten their economic links, deepen cooperation among them, and expand the space for development. The Silk Road, the world’s longest economic and trade corridor with the greatest development potential, would be revived, with countries along the road poised to gain new momentum for economic development and new opportunities for sharing the fruits of cooperation.
On a more concrete level, in looking at the impact of the One Belt, One Road concept on both China and the Eurasia region, one quasi-authoritative source involved in the study of the One Belt, One Road concept within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) identifies three major geoeconomic and geopolitical purposes: The aim for China is to speed up the development of the western region. The one belt and one road will turn the western interior into the frontier in opening up to the world, development opportunities in the central and western regions will increase, and new growth points will emerge . . . this will be beneficial for enduring energy sources and resources, and also for transferring strongpoint industries from the eastern to the central and western regions and to countries on our periphery. . . . For the region, the aim is to enhance Asia’s status in the world industrial chain. The majority of Asian countries are developing countries, and their economic development markedly lags behind East Asia and Europe. Through cooperation in points leading forward areas, such as industrial parks, we can enhance Asia’s status as an entity in world economy. For China’s relations with the region, the aim is to form a community of destiny. Forming a community of interests, a community of development and responsibility, and a community of destiny is the three-stage aim of China with the frontier countries.
Although few if any authoritative Chinese sources identify specific priorities among the many goals of the One Belt, One Road initiative, as suggested above, “facilities” (infrastructure) is perhaps the most significant, since it provides the necessary means for attaining many of the other goals mentioned above.19 Moreover, the emphasis on building connectivity is seen by some Chinese sources as a means of addressing “a lack of balance among various sub-regions in Asia in terms of development” and an absence of “strong [economic] bonds” between these sub-regions.”20 In addition, regarding geographic priorities, at least one quasi-authoritative source states that “Central Asia, Russia, South Asia, and Southeast Asian countries will be given priority consideration . . . while Middle Eastern and East African countries are in the junction” linking the Asian with European countries. The author adds that over the long term, “Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and some African countries may also participate in cooperation.”
As the above suggests, another major feature of the One Belt, One Road initiative is that it is purportedly intended to be as open and inclusive as possible, apparently involving few if any requirements or restrictions, and to exist in cooperation with, and not against, other international development initiatives. Many authoritative sources have made this point. For example, Xi Jinping stated in March 2015, at the Boao Forum: In promoting this initiative, China will follow the principle of wide consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits. The programs of development will be open and inclusive, not exclusive. They will be a real chorus comprising all countries along the routes, not a solo for China itself. To develop the Belt and Road is not to replace existing mechanisms or initiatives for regional cooperation. Much to the contrary, we will build on the existing basis to help countries align their development strategies and form complementarity.
Earlier in March, during the annual NPC session, Wang Yi stated: We will carry out equal-footed consultation and respect the independent choice of other countries. We will be sensitive to the comfort level of other parties, ensure transparency and openness, align the initiative with the development strategies of other participants, and create synergy with the existing regional cooperation mechanisms.
Zhong Sheng went somewhat further, stating in 2014: In the course of jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt, China will abide by the spirit of openness and inclusiveness. It will not create any mechanism that is closed, rigid, or anti-foreign, much less intervene in another nation’s internal affairs or seek to dominate in regional affairs or create a sphere of influence. Both conceptually and practically, the Silk Road Economic Belt is not a Chinese matter, but a joint undertaking of all the countries concerned. It is not China’s exclusive interests belt, but a belt where the nations share interests.
Wu Jianmin states that the process for achieving inclusiveness involves the so-called three “togethers” allegedly proposed by Xi Jinping. As Wu writes, “The first ‘together’ is discussion among the parties concerned to identify projects of cooperation for mutual benefit. The second is working together to realize the projects on the basis of common interest. And the third is enjoying together the fruits of this common endeavor. The ‘Belt and Road Initiatives’ are inclusive rather than exclusive.” In stressing the open and cooperative nature of the One Belt, One Road initiative, many Chinese sources of all types use the metaphor of a “symphony,” involving the participation of many countries, and not a “solo” effort by China alone. 26 Unsurprisingly, non-authoritative Chinese sources generally provide further details about the purpose and meaning of the One Belt, One Road initiative, at times including a geostrategic interpretation. For example, one source describes the initiative as a “response” to the new geopolitical situation marked by the U.S. “rebalance to Asia,” Japan’s accelerated “steps toward normalization,” India’s rapid economic growth, and increasing wariness toward a stronger China among China’s “neighboring Asian countries.” In this view, the One Belt, One Road concept stands at the core of an effort by China to move away from: viewing itself as simply an East Asian country to an identity as part of Central Asia and a main power on the Eurasian continent. This means China is clearly returning to a traditional regional focus: paying attention to all of China’s neighbors rather than some of them.
From this geopolitical perspective, many of these non-authoritative Chinese sources refer to the One Belt, One Road initiative as a new kind of “strategy” designed to support the larger effort enunciated by Xi Jinping, to strengthen Beijing’s periphery diplomacy and create a “new type of major country relations,” both of which are based on intensive cooperation and a zero-sum (i.e., “win-win”) approach to international politics and economics. As suggested above, for many non-authoritative Chinese observers, the One Belt, One Road initiative is thus also a major part of China’s overall reform-based economic development strategy. In fact, the supposed importance of the One Belt, One Road initiative to the overall Chinese reform process has led one Chinese observer to state: From the perspective of policy, advancing the ‘One Belt, One Road’ has been elevated to the level of China’s national development strategy and has become an integral part of China’s new round of reform and opening up . . . We can see that the building of ‘One Belt, One Road’ has been placed in an unprecedentedly important position in China‘s national strategy. Another non-authoritative source similarly stresses the nature of the One Belt, One Road “strategy” as a response to a new economic situation: where the market, energy resources, and external investment integrate extensively. Through the development of the ‘Belt and Road’ strategy, the effort of opening wider to the outside world, and internal introduction and external linkage, we will effectively promote the adjustment of the economic structure and further promote China‘s economic transformation and upgrading.30 Given its stated importance, for many Chinese observers, the One Belt, One Road concept “has a very important status in the journey of realizing the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Indeed, the preceding source concludes, rather breathlessly, that China’s peaceful development depends on this move, China’s major power diplomacy depends on this move, the community of destiny with which China and the people of all countries in the world to safeguard peace and promote development depends on this move.
For some non-authoritative Chinese analysts, the emphasis of the One Belt, One Road initiative on infrastructure development signifies the “export [of] China’s development blueprint to the world.” Hence for some Chinese observers, the One Belt, One Road concept does much more than merely stimulate the growth of China’s western regions. For other non-authoritative observers, the natural evolution of such a central strategy— involving a more active Chinese effort to promote both geostrategic relations across Eurasia and China’s own economic development program—implies a movement beyond economics alone to cultural cooperation and even military and security affairs. As Li Xiangyang (director of CASS Asia-Pacific and Global Strategic Studies Institute) states: The one belt and one road with the aims of achieving the “five links” and creating a community of destiny is bound to involve cooperation in a whole series of non-economic fields. First, ensure the security of transport routes, especially the sea routes. . . . Maintaining sea lane security involves a great deal of nontraditional security cooperation, such as jointly combating piracy, joint sea rescue work, and multinational joint law enforcement. . . . Second, strengthen antiterrorism cooperation at regional level. Terrorism is the tumor in the political stability and economic development of many countries along the one belt and one road route, and is also the main obstacle to regional cooperation. . . . Third, establish a mechanism for settling territorial land and sea disputes…. We should set up with the countries along the route dispute contingency and settlement mechanisms in order to handle and eventually resolve these disputes. Fourth, give impetus to common exploitation of marine resources. Under the premise that territorial land and sea disputes cannot be finally settled in a short time, establishing a mechanism for joint exploitation of marine resources is also an essential condition for the normal operation of one belt and one road.
Indeed, for some non-authoritative Chinese military observers, the maritime portion of the One Belt, One Road initiative constitutes “‘the crucial strategic direction of China’s rise’. . . indicating a belief that developing the route will be critical to the country’s entire development program.”34 As implied above, some non-authoritative Chinese military observers see a clear need for China to strengthen its sea lane security as part of the One Belt, One Road initiative. For some, this could require an enhanced level of PLA access to necessary military support facilities along the maritime route, but not Chinese bases per se.35 For others, such as the National Defense University professor and strategist Liang Fang, the security of the sea lanes involved in the One Belt, One Road undertaking will ultimately require very significant capabilities, including carrier battle groups on station. In other words, the One Belt, One Road concept is linked, in the views of some Chinese military (and probably mostly naval) analysts, with a robust blue water naval capability dedicated to sea lines of communication (SLOC) defense.36 Thus, for at least some non-authoritative Chinese observers, the One Belt, One Road initiative clearly has the potential to affect a wide variety of areas beyond economic growth and development.
Overall, while the One Belt, One Road initiative offers considerable potential in several economic, political, cultural, and strategic realms, it also presents many uncertainties and potential concerns. It has clearly become a major foreign and economic policy hallmark of the Xi Jinping government and is consistently supported as such by all manner of Chinese observers. While it is generally not depicted as a means of enhancing Beijing’s influence across Eurasia, there is little doubt that it will be measured in large part in those terms, and in its development impact on the region. Ultimately, the success or failure of the One Belt, One Road concept will depend in no small measure on the resources that Beijing is willing and able to devote to it, the adroitness of China’s leaders and entrepreneurs in applying those resources to local conditions, and the benefits that it produces not only for China but perhaps more importantly for the recipient nations. For this to happen, the Chinese leadership and the One Belt, One Road supporters within China must get beyond the rhetoric and slogans and develop an action plan based on sound economic principles and an acute understanding of the needs of the One Belt, One Road participants, as well as considerable sensitivity to the fears of outside or peripheral major powers such as India, Russia, Europe, and the United States. Perhaps the foremost danger is that, in developing and implementing such an action plan, this enormously ambitious undertaking will run afoul of the strong tendency of the Chinese political system to overlook deficiencies and outside sensitivities for the sake of pleasing the top leaders.
Taken from Michael D. Swaine: Chinese Views and Commentary on the One Belt, One Road Initiative.