As the United States under Donald Trump dismantles green energy programs and returns to fossil-fuel politics, China has moved into a different league. While Washington argues over subsidies and regulations, Beijing is exporting entire clean-energy systems at industrial scale – and turning Africa into the most visible example of how far the balance of power has shifted.

Chinese solar plants, mini-grids and battery hubs are lighting up regions that remained energy-poor for decades, powered by hardware the US simply can’t compete with on price or volume. Each new shipment of ultra-cheap panels pushes Beijing deeper into markets Washington once hoped to influence, and cements China’s role as the dominant force in the technologies that will define the next century.

The rivalry is no longer theoretical. One side is shaping the future of global energy; the other is watching that future slip out of reach. The real question is how much of the emerging energy order will end up built on Chinese terms – and what space, if any, the US will have in it.

China’s rise in the clean-energy sector didn’t happen by accident or market luck. It is the product of a state-driven industrial machine built to dominate every link of the solar supply chain – from polysilicon processing and wafer cutting to battery chemistry and grid-scale storage. No other country has anything comparable.

In 2024, China installed about 329 gigawatts of new solar capacity, lifting its total to more than 1,100 gigawatts – the largest of any country and a scale unmatched globally. The annual increase alone exceeded the entire installed solar capacity of many nations.

That scale is not just impressive – it rewrites the economics of the industry. Chinese panels now cost as little as $0.07–0.09 per watt, a level Western producers cannot approach even with subsidies.

Behind these numbers is a model built on economies of scale, public subsidies and an industrial policy focused on cost control and supply-chain integration. This combination allows China to push prices down while reinforcing a manufacturing ecosystem that continues to expand faster than the country can absorb internally.

China’s rapid production growth has far exceeded domestic demand, creating the excess capacity that now fuels its global expansion. By turning this surplus into a strategic export industry, Beijing is able to supply ultra-cheap hardware at a scale Western manufacturers cannot match. What appears as “overcapacity” in Western policy debates is, for China, a deliberate industrial advantage that opens new markets and strengthens its position in the global energy economy.

Beijing’s leadership makes clear that the energy transition is not an experiment but a strategic direction. Speaking at the United Nations in 2025, President Xi Jinping described the low-carbon shift as a historic course that countries must pursue without hesitation. It was less a diplomatic appeal than a statement of intent: China sees the transition as a strategic arena it intends to shape, while others are still debating whether to commit.

If there is one region that exposes the scale of China’s clean-energy push, it is Africa. The continent has some of the world’s best solar potential and some of its weakest energy systems. For Beijing, this combination is an opening.

Around 600 million Africans still lack reliable electricity. Entire national grids operate on aging infrastructure, blackouts can last hours or days, and diesel generators remain the default backup in everything from hospitals to small shops. In many countries, the cost of that diesel power reaches $0.70 per kilowatt-hour – an impossible price for households and a constant drag on local businesses.

Chinese solar projects arrive into this environment with instant impact. Mini-grids tested in Nigeria, for example, supply electricity for roughly $0.16 per kilowatt-hour, and the initial capital outlay recoups itself in a matter of months. The difference isn’t marginal; it is transformative. In some rural regions, Chinese installations provide the first steady electricity supply people have seen in their lifetimes.

The scale of adoption is accelerating. From June 2024 to June 2025, African imports of Chinese solar panels jumped by 60% – from 9.4 gigawatts to 15 gigawatts. South Africa alone bought 3.7 gigawatts. Nigeria’s imports quadrupled to 1.7 gigawatts. Algeria’s soared by a factor of 33. These numbers reflect more than demand. They show that China is becoming the default supplier for a continent moving, however unevenly, into the clean-energy era.

Beijing’s approach combines hardware, financing and infrastructure in one package. State agencies, political banks and companies like PowerChina handle the entire chain: surveying sites, building systems, supplying equipment, providing engineers and structuring long-term repayment. African governments don’t have to deal with fragmented contractors or Western lenders who impose political conditions. China delivers a turnkey system – from panels to batteries to maintenance crews.

FOCAC, the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, gives this system its diplomatic backbone. Recent action plans commit to expanding solar, wind, hydropower and emerging hydrogen projects, as well as building low-carbon industrial zones. These agreements bind energy development to broader economic cooperation, deepening Beijing’s role far beyond individual projects.

And the payoff for China is clear. Every new installation ties African states into Chinese standards and Chinese supply chains. Access to minerals – cobalt, manganese, graphite – often comes through parallel agreements linked to the same infrastructure projects. In political terms, Beijing positions itself as a strategic development partner – a message that lands well on a continent long frustrated with Western conditionality and slow delivery.

Marcus Vinícius de Freitas, policy expert at the Policy Center for the New South, in a 2025 emphasis:

“African development should follow strategic and not transactional objectives. This is where the Chinese presence in Africa can enjoy a plausible opportunity. By recalibrating from a model of project-driven engagement to one that is genuinely partnership-driven, Chinese investment will match more closely with African strategic visions..”

China’s expansion is political. Clean-energy systems create built-in dependencies that deepen over time. Panels require compatible inverters. Batteries rely on specific chemistries. Smart grids run on proprietary software. Once a country adopts Chinese systems, switching suppliers becomes prohibitively expensive and technically risky.

Beijing reinforces this model through what it calls “small and beautiful” projects – modular clean-energy installations that avoid the backlash associated with megaprojects. Many come bundled with agreements granting Chinese companies access to critical minerals such as cobalt, manganese and graphite. Infrastructure unlocks resources; resources guarantee repayment. The cycle feeds itself.

This form of leverage is not new in global politics. It echoes the classic pattern of oil diplomacy in the 20th century, when control over energy supply chains shaped alliances, dependencies and geopolitical spheres. China is now adapting that model to the clean-energy era, using solar hardware, battery systems and grid infrastructure to build influence where oil once defined power.

African analysts are already highlighting this shift. As Fikayo Akeredolu, a researcher on China–Africa relations at Oxford, notes: “Unlike the 2021 Dakar Action Plan, which explicitly mentioned oil and gas, the Beijing plan centers on renewable-energy cooperation and clean-energy power supply. It signals a decisive move away from fossil-fuel projects toward a different model of influence.”

Rivals struggle to respond, and even their most ambitious initiatives have failed to match China’s speed, scale or pricing power.

The global contest for clean-energy dominance is often framed as a competition of ideas or climate strategies. In practice, it is a competition of capacity – and only one country currently has the scale, supply chains and political machinery required to shape the transition. The United States, Europe, the Gulf states and Russia all have ambitions, but none can match what China has already built.

Washington’s position is defined less by technological limits than by political instability. Under Donald Trump, federal support for renewable energy has been rolled back, environmental programs dismantled, and long-term planning disrupted. Every election cycle resets America’s energy priorities, making sustained industrial policy almost impossible.

The US can innovate. It can subsidize. But it cannot compete with a vertically integrated Chinese system that produces hardware at one-tenth of US prices and ships gigawatts of equipment on demand. Tariffs don’t close that gap. Rhetoric doesn’t either.

Europe presents itself as a global climate leader, yet its energy transition depends heavily on Chinese components – solar modules, batteries, raw material processing, inverters and grid hardware. Attempts to rebuild domestic manufacturing collide with high production costs, fragmented decision-making and years of outsourcing.

Even major players are feeling the strain. In 2025, Volkswagen suspended operations at two German EV plants due to weak demand. Spain had to rely on 2,000 Chinese technicians to launch a new CATL–Stellantis battery facility. Europe has targets and doctrine, but not the industrial depth to execute them independently.

The UAE and Saudi Arabia are investing aggressively in African renewables. Masdar and ACWA Power have become major players in wind and solar development. But their strength is financial – project capital, not manufacturing. They do not control the global production of panels, batteries or grid technologies. They can sponsor projects; they cannot reshape supply chains.

Russia maintains a visible – and in some cases strategically important – footprint in Africa through nuclear energy. The $28.75 billion El Dabaa nuclear plant in Egypt is the flagship example, with other projects under discussion in Ethiopia, Niger and South Africa.

But nuclear power is not a mass-deployment solution. It cannot compete with cheap, modular solar systems that can be built in months. Russia’s influence is concentrated and long-term, but not transformative on a continental scale.

Every major actor has strengths. None can match China’s ability to deliver the full package: manufacturing scale, low-cost hardware, turnkey infrastructure, financing and political consistency.

The result is a structural imbalance. While the US and EU debate frameworks and incentives, China is wiring entire regions into its energy ecosystem. In this race, speed and scale matter more than declarations. And China has both.

China’s clean-energy surge marks the emergence of a new geopolitical model: the electrostate. Instead of projecting power through hydrocarbons or military alliances, Beijing leverages control of the technologies and supply chains that will run the global energy system of the future.

In the last century, power centered on oil wells and pipelines. Today, it revolves around silicon, lithium, copper and the infrastructure that transforms them into electricity. China dominates each stage of that chain.

The influence this creates expands automatically. Every solar farm built with Chinese technology requires Chinese servicing and parts. Every battery installed today guarantees future contracts tomorrow. Over time, these dependencies evolve into political alignment and long-term economic cooperation.

International agencies warn that such imbalances threaten global energy security. China hears the warnings – and continues building.

Clean energy is becoming a foundation of geopolitical alignment. Countries that integrate into China’s energy ecosystem will rely on it for decades. And Beijing is shaping that system faster than any competitor can respond.

By André Benoit, graduate at France’s European and International Studies.posted by Russia Today.