Global trade routes are in a state of permanent transformation, and habitual directions of cargo movement change beyond recognition in mere months. One such direction, which until recently was considered a pillar of Eurasian logistics, is the railway corridor between China and Europe. Data for 2025 demonstrate: the so-called New Silk Road is increasingly turning into a one-way road. This is not just a temporary slowdown, but a worrying symptom of deep changes, indicating that in the opposite direction — from West to East — there will soon physically be nothing to carry.
Analysts recorded that by the end of last year, the total volume of railway freight flow between China and the European Union in the Northern Corridor decreased by 14.1%, amounting to 310,579 TEU. This fall nullified the short-term growth of 2024. However, behind the general figures lies a much more dramatic picture: deliveries from Europe to China by rail plummeted by 22.7%, reaching a historical low of 38,422 TEU.
At the same time, exports from China to Europe grew in value terms by 8.4% to $560 billion.
As a result, a monstrous imbalance has arisen: the flow ratio reached 7:1. For every seven full containers going West, only one returns loaded to the East.
January figures on one hand are pleasing, but on the other, they merely confirm last year's dynamics. In the first month of the year, container transport between the Celestial Empire and the EU grew by 22%, showing a plus of eight per cent compared to December. The lion's share of "boxes" (9 out of 10) travels along the Central Eurasian Corridor, that is, through the RF, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Meanwhile, the aforementioned export/import ratio on the China–Europe–China route demonstrates the same habitual tilt: 87% of goods travel to the EU, and only 13% travel back.
Notably, the entire China Railway Express (CRE) network sent more than 20,000 trains for the first time in 2025, showing growth of 3.2%. Но this growth is no longer connected with Europe. A radical redistribution has occurred: the European direction now accounts for only 15.1% of goods, while the lion's share of 85% goes to Russia, Central Asia, and other non-European regions. Asia became the driver of growth, increasing freight flow by 27.7% to 1.13 million TEU, which is 3.6 times higher than transport volumes to the EU.
The 7:1 imbalance sets a task for carriers within the classical model: returning empty containers eats up all the profitability of transport from China. When the flow becomes one-way, the industry needs unconventional technological answers.
One of the most rational solutions given the "empty" West could be the introduction of the disposable container concept. If there is no return cargo and none is foreseen in the coming years due to Europe's de-industrialisation, then the cost of returning a steel "box" across the whole of Eurasia becomes absurd. Switching to cheaper, perhaps composite or simplified designs intended for disposal or secondary recycling at the destination, could save the economy of Chinese exports. This will allow for avoiding unnecessary shunting work and costs for repositioning empties, which railway workers are so used to but which in the new reality becomes an unaffordable luxury.
The problem for Europe is a critical loading imbalance, exacerbated by a reduction in exports from the EU, including due to difficulties in German industry. In search of sustainability, logistics operators are developing alternative routes, such as the Trans-Caspian, believes Maria Nikitina, founder of N. Trans Lab:
"Short-term prospects for the China–EU corridor may be linked to the development of niche segments like e-commerce and the introduction of fixed schedules, however, systemic risks and the price factor continue to limit its mass attractiveness. We see that the reasons for the reduction in the transit rail flow are related not only to the Special Military Operation and sanctions restrictions, although not without them either. Thus, Chinese banks are seriously limiting settlement possibilities. Most likely, the root of the causes lies deeper — in the China–EU trade imbalance. If the trend persists, we should hardly count on growth in the transit freight flow."
We are witnessing the sunset of the transit "bridge" era in its classical sense. The Silk Road is not disappearing, but it is rapidly changing its nature, adapting to a world where the EU ceases to be an active exporter. The stagnation of the European direction is not a random glitch, but a long-term trend dictated by the industrial crisis of the Old World.
Normalization of sea freight became the key factor in the fall of rail transit attractiveness to Europe. If in 2024, against the backdrop of attacks in the Red Sea, rates soared and the railway became a temporary salvation, in 2025 the situation stabilised. The sea route again became significantly cheaper, and shippers not tied to strict deadlines returned to the ports.
The "Małaszewicze factor" plays an equally important role. The system became a hostage to a single route: about 94% of all traffic passed through Poland by the end of the year. A two-week blockade on the Polish-Belarusian border in September 2025 showed how vulnerable this path is to any border incidents.
However, the root of the problem lies deeper — in the industrial crisis of Europe itself. The reduction of exports from the EU, particularly from Germany, indicates that the European economy is finding it increasingly difficult to compete in Asian markets. Deliveries of German machinery and automotive products to China by rail demonstrate a rapid reduction.
By the end of 2025, railway transit in the EU–China corridor continued to decline for the second year in a row. Total transport volume decreased, and the return flow from Europe to China reached a historical low. This indicates not a temporary dip, but structural changes in the whole of Eurasian logistics, Mikhail Koptev, commercial director of Skif-Cargo, told VG.
"The key reason for the fall is a combination of economic and geopolitical factors. On one hand, after the normalisation of sea logistics and the reduction of freight rates, railway transport lost its price advantage. In the absence of strict time constraints, shippers are again mass-choosing the sea as the cheapest delivery method. On the other hand, high political and infrastructure risks persist. The closure of the Polish-Belarusian border in autumn 2025 for several days caused disruptions and sharply increased route risks. This became a signal to the market about the route's instability. Even short-term stops in such corridors critically undermine customer trust and force them to build in additional logistical reserves. Additional pressure is exerted by China's weak imports from the EU. European exports are stagnating, return loads are shrinking, and as a result, the economy of railway routes is noticeably worsening.
In 2026, a rapid recovery of EU–China transit is not to be expected. The most likely scenario is stagnation or a moderate decline in volumes. Growth is possible only in individual niches: e-commerce (replenishing Shein and AliExpress warehouses in Europe), urgent goods of the medium price category, furniture, interior goods, and the DIY segment. However, even in these segments, railway transport will no longer regain its mass character and will remain a niche logistical solution between sea and air," says the expert.
It is obvious that Russia's role in this scheme is undergoing fundamental changes. Instead of the habitual transit corridor connecting two distant economic poles, the country is integrating into a new axis oriented towards internal Eurasian trade.
The reduction in volumes in the EU–China direction means not a fall in the RF's transit potential as a whole, but its deep transformation. The classical China–EU route through the territory of the RF and Belarus is gradually losing strategic importance, Mikhail Koptev continues.
"Instead, a new logistical axis is forming: China – Central Asia – Russia – Middle East – India, as well as routes to Turkey, Iran, and Caucasian countries. In effect, Russia is moving from the role of a transit bridge between China and Europe to the role of a major Eurasian distribution hub serving trade within Greater Eurasia. The North–South international transport corridor, China – Central Asia – RF – Turkey routes, intra-Eurasian trade, and e-commerce flows are becoming the most promising. Key risks for the EU-China direction include continuing geopolitical instability in Eastern Europe, the probability of new restrictions on the Polish-Belarusian border, weak EU economic growth, and the active development of alternative routes bypassing Russia and Belarus. Collectively, this makes the EU–China corridor through RF territory politically sensitive and strategically unstable. The EU–China corridor in current conditions ceases to be a mass transport direction and is increasingly turning into a niche route for individual categories of cargo. The main potential for Russia's transit growth is shifting towards the corridors of Central Asia, the Middle East, India, and Caucasian countries," the interlocutor notes.
In this situation, success awaits those who are first to abandon attempts to reanimate old schemes and switch to new formats, from developing corridors within Greater Eurasia to implementing one-way logistics technologies, including those very disposable containers. The future of transit now lies not in attempts to balance East and West, but in the ability to effectively serve the one-way flow of goods in a new, multipolar reality.
Reported by Vgudok (Russia).
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| SOE | Key African Ports | Operational Model |
| China Merchants Group | Djibouti, Lomé (Togo), Lagos | BOOT, equity stakes |
| COSCO Shipping | Suez Canal Zone, Durban | Terminal operations |
| China Harbour Engineering | Lekki (Nigeria), Bagamoyo | Construction + Operation |
| China Communications Construction Group (CCCC) | Multiple across 15+ countries | EPC + financing |
| Port | Dual-Use Features |
| Victoria (Seychelles) | Deep draft, repair facilities, isolated location |
| Tin Can Island (Nigeria) | Large berths, proximity to naval base |
| Walvis Bay (Namibia) | Strategic Atlantic position, deep water |
| Nacala (Mozambique) | Mozambique Channel chokepoint, upgrade capacity |
China's expansion in Africa through ports and logistics infrastructure represents a multifaceted strategy combining economic investment, trade facilitation, and geopolitical positioning. Based on comprehensive mapping and analysis of Chinese-financed, developed, or managed ports across the continent, Beijing has established a significant presence in over 40 ports, with stakes in up to 78 facilities across 32 African nations as of 2026.
This network spans from North Africa's Mediterranean coast to Southern Africa's Atlantic and Indian Ocean shores, enabling enhanced logistics capabilities that support China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Investments exceeding $50 billion since 2013 have driven port modernizations, rail connections, and industrial zones, boosting Africa-China trade to $348 billion in 2025 — a 17.7% increase from the prior year. However, this expansion raises concerns about debt sustainability , sovereignty erosion , and dual-use potential for military purposes , as evidenced by increased People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) port calls and exercises. While offering economic benefits like improved connectivity and job creation, the strategy underscores China's aim to secure supply chains and influence global maritime routes, prompting calls for balanced partnerships from African stakeholders.
China's port expansion in Africa has evolved from opportunistic infrastructure financing to a comprehensive maritime strategy that integrates economic development with geopolitical positioning. Contemporary mapping of Chinese port activities reveals a systematic approach to establishing presence along Africa's critical coastlines, from the Mediterranean to the Indian and Atlantic Oceans.
The geographic distribution of Chinese port investments demonstrates strategic prioritization:
· East Africa: Heavy concentration along Indian Ocean trade routes, including Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique
· West Africa: Strategic positioning in the Gulf of Guinea, particularly Nigeria, Ghana, and Côte d'Ivoire
· North Africa: Mediterranean access points in Egypt and Algeria
· Southern Africa: Atlantic and Indian Ocean terminals in South Africa, Angola, and Namibia
Recent analysis identifies multiple categories of Chinese port engagement, differentiated by operational control, financing models, and military integration potential. Countries with the most viable dual-use ports include Nigeria, Angola, and Namibia, while ongoing projects span at least 15 additional nations.
This visualization underscores China's strategic focus on Africa's coastlines, aligning with broader logistics expansions under the BRI. As of 2026, China's involvement has evolved from mere infrastructure financing to operational control and military integration, reshaping regional trade dynamics and global supply chains.
China's port expansion in Africa has accelerated dramatically since the launch of the BRI in 2013, with investments totaling approximately $160 billion in broader development financing, including $50 billion specifically allocated to port infrastructure. This represents one of the largest foreign infrastructure investment programs in African history, surpassing traditional development partners in both scale and speed.
Recent mapping identifies at least 17 major projects in East Africa alone, including:
· Kenya: Mombasa Port expansion and Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET)
· Djibouti: Doraleh Multipurpose Port and Container Terminal
· Tanzania: Dar es Salaam, Tanga, Bagamoyo, and Mtwara port developments
· Mozambique: Nacala Corridor integration
West African hubs reflect equally significant investments. Nigeria's Lekki Deep Sea Port, inaugurated in 2023, operates under a 45-year build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) agreement with China Harbor Engineering Company and Tolaram Group, representing a $1.5 billion investment. Additional West African projects include ports in Ghana (Tema expansion), Côte d'Ivoire (Abidjan modernization), and Sierra Leone (Freetown container terminal).
Chinese State-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate African port operations through structured contractual arrangements:
|
SOE |
Key African Ports |
Operational Model |
|
China Merchants Group |
Djibouti, Lomé (Togo), Lagos |
BOOT, equity stakes |
|
COSCO Shipping |
Suez Canal Zone, Durban |
Terminal operations |
|
China Harbour Engineering |
Lekki (Nigeria), Bagamoyo |
Construction + Operation |
|
China Communications Construction Group (CCCC) |
Multiple across 15+ countries |
EPC + financing |
The BOOT model, prevalent in at least 12 major projects, grants Chinese operators control for 25-99 years, during which they manage operations, collect revenues, and eventually transfer assets to host governments. This structure enables China to secure long-term strategic positioning while African nations gain immediate infrastructure without upfront capital.
In Tanzania, the revival of Bagamoyo Port negotiations in 2021 led to a restructured agreement emphasizing Tanzanian equity participation and technology transfer, reflecting evolving African negotiating capacity. The project, initially valued at $10 billion, now proceeds with phased development and local content requirements.
Chinese port investments extend beyond maritime terminals to comprehensive logistics networks integrating rail, road, and industrial zones. This “port-rail-industrial park” model creates end-to-end supply chains that enhance China's access to African resources and markets:
· Djibouti-Ethiopia Railway: 756 km standard gauge railway linking Doraleh Port to Addis Ababa, reducing transit time from 7 days to 12 hours
· Kenya Standard Gauge Railway: Connects Mombasa to Nairobi and eventually targeting Uganda and Rwanda
· Tanzania Central Railway: Planned extension linking Bagamoyo to DRC copper belt
· Angola Benguela Railway: Rehabilitation connecting Lobito Port to Zambian Copperbelt
These corridors facilitate resource extraction and export, particularly critical minerals. The DRC-Zambia copper belt, accessed via Dar es Salaam and Lobito, exemplifies how port investments enable China to secure cobalt, copper, and other inputs for manufacturing and renewable energy technologies.
Recent satellite imagery from 2026 reveals massive capacity upgrades in Mombasa (30% increase in container handling), Djibouti (doubling of berth capacity), and Lekki (Africa's deepest port at 16.5m draft), positioning these facilities as regional transshipment hubs.
Logistics infrastructure forms the backbone of China's African strategy, enabling efficient trade flows and supply chain resilience. The cumulative effect of port, rail, and road investments has dramatically reduced transit times and costs, facilitating unprecedented trade growth.
In 2025, China-Africa trade reached $348 billion, representing a 17.7% year-over-year increase and solidifying China's position as Africa's largest trading partner for the 15th consecutive year.
This growth was driven by:
· 25.8% surge in Chinese exports to Africa, totaling $193 billion (machinery, electronics, textiles, consumer goods)
· 5.4% increase in African exports to China, reaching $155 billion (raw materials, minerals, agricultural products)
· Reduction in average shipping costs by 30-40% on major corridors since 2015
· Decrease in average port dwell time from 14 days to 5-7 days at upgraded facilities
Port capacity expansions have been substantial. Dar es Salaam's Chinese-financed upgrades increased annual throughput from 5 million to 13 million TEUs between 2015 and 2025. Djibouti's container terminal now handles over 2 million TEUs annually, transforming the nation into a regional logistics hub serving landlocked Ethiopia, South Sudan, and beyond.
Chinese port investments generate tangible – in the short term – economic benefits for host nations:
Direct and indirect employment from port construction and operations exceeds 100,000 positions across major projects. Lekki Port alone created 200,000 jobs during construction and 170,000 permanent positions. However, concerns persist about labor conditions and the dominance of Chinese workers in skilled positions.
Modern port management systems, crane operations, and logistics software represent knowledge transfers. Countries like Ethiopia and Kenya have established training programs with Chinese partners, though critics argue these remain limited compared to traditional development assistance models.
Beyond ports, associated investments in rails, roads, and special economic zones (SEZs) upgrade national infrastructure. The Djibouti International Free Trade Zone, Africa's largest at 48.2 km², operates under a 50-year China Merchants concession, attracting manufacturing and logistics tenants.
Initiatives like Africa's first EV battery gigafactory in Morocco, scheduled for 2026 production with Chinese partnership, signal potential shifts from raw material export toward value-added industries. Similar projects are emerging in lithium processing (Zimbabwe) and rare earth refinement (Kenya).
Despite benefits, significant challenges characterizing China-Africa port financing:
Many projects rely on loans from China Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of China at commercial or near-commercial rates (2-6% interest, 15-20 year terms). Countries like Kenya, Zambia, and Angola carry substantial Chinese debt, raising default risks. Kenya's SGR debt exceeds $5 billion, requiring annual repayments that strain government budgets.
The precedent of Sri Lanka's Hambantota Port, leased to China Merchants for 99 years after debt default, heightens African concerns about sovereignty loss through “debt-trap diplomacy”. While Chinese officials dispute this characterization, citing debt restructuring and write-offs, the power asymmetry remains evident.
Africa's persistent trade deficit with China ($38 billion in 2025) reflects concentration in low-value commodity exports versus high-value manufactured imports. Port infrastructure primarily facilitates resource extraction rather than African industrialization, perpetuating colonial-era trade patterns.
Chinese contractors often import materials and labor, limiting local economic participation. The 2024-2027 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Action Plan emphasizes technology transfer, local content requirements, and joint ventures, but implementation varies widely.
The strategic implications of China's port network extend well beyond commercial logistics. Analysis of port characteristics, PLA Navy activity patterns, and Chinese official statements reveals deliberate dual-use planning — facilities designed for both economic and potential military purposes.
Djibouti Naval Base: China's first overseas military base, established in 2017 at Doraleh, represents the most explicit military integration. Originally justified for antipiracy operations, the facility has expanded significantly:
· Berth increased capacity to accommodate destroyers, frigates, and potentially aircraft carriers
· Underground bunkers and hardened facilities visible in 2024 satellite imagery
· Permanent garrison expanded from 2,000 to 3,000+ personnel
· Strategic positioning 8 km from US Camp Lemonnier, France's largest overseas base, and Japanese Self-Defense Force facilities
This concentration of great power military infrastructure in Djibouti underscores the Horn of Africa's emergence as a strategic competition zone.
Documented PLA Navy port visits to Africa reached at least 15 in 2024-2025, the highest annual total on record. Key patterns include:
· Regular calls at Djibouti, Dar es Salaam, Mombasa, and Lagos for antipiracy task force rotations
· Joint naval exercises with South Africa (“Mosi” series), Tanzania, and Nigeria
· Port visits coinciding with major Chinese-built infrastructure inaugurations
· Increasing sophistication of vessels, including Type 055 destroyers and Type 075 amphibious assault ships
Multilateral exercises like “Will for Peace 2026” under BRICS formats signal institutionalization of China's naval presence in African waters.
|
Port |
Dual-Use Features |
|
Victoria (Seychelles) |
Deep draft, repair facilities, isolated location |
|
Tin Can Island (Nigeria) |
Large berths, proximity to naval base |
|
Walvis Bay (Namibia) |
Strategic Atlantic position, deep water |
|
Nacala (Mozambique) |
Mozambique Channel chokepoint, upgrade capacity |
While none currently function as declared military bases beyond Djibouti, infrastructure upgrades (deepening, lengthening berths, fuel storage) create latent military capability that could be activated in crisis scenarios.
China's African port network directly supports its sea lines of communication (SLOC) security strategy. Approximately 80% of China's oil imports transit the Indian Ocean, passing through critical chokepoints:
· Suez Canal: 12% of global trade; Chinese port investments in Egypt (Port Said, Alexandria) secure access
· Bab el-Mandeb Strait: 6.2 million barrels/day oil transit; Djibouti base provides security
· Mozambique Channel: Alternative route for oil tankers; Nacala and Maputo upgrades enhance presence
· Cape of Good Hope: Alternative to Suez; South African port agreements provide access
This infrastructure enables China to protect energy supplies, secure resource exports from Africa, and project power along maritime trade routes carrying 90% of global trade by volume.
Chinese control over approximately one-third of Africa's port capacity creates strategic leverage with implications for sovereignty, intelligence gathering, and great power competition:
Long-term operational concessions grant Chinese entities control over critical national infrastructure. Contract terms often include dispute resolution in Chinese courts, limiting host government recourse. In extreme scenarios, port control could enable economic coercion through selective service denial or intelligence collection via port operations data.
Port management systems, shipping data, and cargo information provide intelligence value. Chinese-manufactured port equipment, including cranes and IT systems, may contain embedded surveillance capabilities, as alleged by US officials regarding Chinese-made cranes in American ports.
US, Indian, and European responses reflect concern about Chinese dominance:
· US “Prosper Africa” initiative and Lobito Corridor investment (competing Angolan route)
· India's “Project Mausam” focusing on Indian Ocean littoral infrastructure
· EU “Global Gateway” committing €300 billion for infrastructure competing with BRI
· Quad (US-Japan-India-Australia) coordination on Indo-Pacific infrastructure
Public discourse, particularly on platforms like
The Horn of Africa risks becoming a “superpower contest zone,” with China, US, France, Italy, Japan, and others maintaining military presence in Djibouti and surrounding waters. This militarization complicates regional stability and African agency in security governance.
China's port and logistics expansion in Africa, as comprehensively mapped and analyzed, represents a cornerstone of its global strategy — one that simultaneously delivers economic development benefits while advancing geopolitical objectives. With over 40 ports under Chinese financing, development, or management across 32 nations, and investments exceeding $160 billion since 2013, this infrastructure network has fundamentally reshaped Africa-China economic relations and regional connectivity.
The dual nature of this expansion presents both opportunities and risks for African nations. On one hand, modernized ports, integrated rail corridors, and special economic zones have boosted trade, created jobs, and upgraded infrastructure at unprecedented scale and speed. Africa-China trade reaching $348 billion in 2025 tests to these logistics improvements.
On the other hand, debt sustainability challenges, sovereignty concerns over long-term foreign control, and the dual-use potential of ports for military purposes raise legitimate questions about the long-term implications of Chinese dominance in this critical sector.
The strategic dimensions — evidenced by China's first overseas naval base in Djibouti, increased PLA Navy port calls, and systematic positioning along key sea lines of communication — emphasize that this is not merely a commercial endeavor. It represents deliberate great power positioning in a region central to global energy flows, mineral supply chains, and maritime trade routes.
Beyond economic competition, the security dimension is paramount.
NATO and its partners should view Africa's maritime domain as an emerging frontier for strategic stability, given the growing presence of Chinese dual-use ports capable of supporting military logistics. Establishing a forward-oriented NATO maritime engagement strategy — integrated with EU NAVFOR and regional African commands — would enable real-time intelligence sharing, port security audits, and joint readiness exercises in zones of strategic vulnerability such as the Red Sea, Gulf of Guinea, and Mozambique Channel. This networked approach would both safeguard global sea lines of communication and prevent the gradual militarization of critical African ports under foreign control. By embedding Western naval cooperation as a stabilizing, capacity-building force, NATO can ensure that Africa's waterways remain open, secure, and governed under international law rather than unilateral influence
As FOCAC evolves and African nations gain negotiating experience, the imperative is clear: maximize economic benefits through improved terms, diversify partnerships to prevent overreliance on any single actor, and assert sovereignty over critical infrastructure. International stakeholders, particularly the US, EU, and emerging Indo-Pacific partners, must offer credible alternatives through competitive investments and genuine development partnerships that respect African agency.
The future of Africa's port infrastructure should be determined by African priorities — economic transformation, industrialization, and sustainable development — rather than external geopolitical competition. Achieving this balance requires vigilant governance, transparent negotiations, and multilateral cooperation that places African interests at the center of this maritime transformation.
By Pino Musolino for Italia nel Futuro.
Ocean container shipping demand from China to North America and North Europe continued to break records in June as importers rushed to protect supply chains amid the global disruption caused by conflict in the Red Sea.
The latest data, released this week, shows 800 000 TEU (20ft equivalent container) were shipped...
Ocean container shipping demand from China to North America and North Europe continued to break records in June as importers rushed to protect supply chains amid the global disruption caused by conflict in the Red Sea.
The latest data, released this week, shows 800 000 TEU (20ft equivalent container) were shipped...
China is maintaining continuous communication with the United States ahead of the sixth round of trade talks that is expected to convene soon, the Ministry of Commerce said at a news conference on Thursday, underscoring Beijing's efforts to keep bilateral economic ties on a stable footing.
The ministry said that through...
China is maintaining continuous communication with the United States ahead of the sixth round of trade talks that is expected to convene soon, the Ministry of Commerce said at a news conference on Thursday, underscoring Beijing's efforts to keep bilateral economic ties on a stable footing.
The ministry said that through...
