2024 saw a record year of Chinese BRI engagement with USD70.7 billion in construction contracts and about USD51 billion in investments. Cumulatively, Chinese BRI engagement has reached USD 1.175 trillion since 2013. Preliminary data on Chinese engagement through financial investments and contractual cooperation for 2024 in the 149 countries of the Belt and Road Initiative show about 340 deals worth USD121.8 billion. This compares to USD 92.3 billion BRI engagement in all of 2023—an increase of 31%.
The share of Chinese engagement in the BRI through investments compared to construction dropped in 2024 and reached about 42% of BRI engagement compared to 53% in 2023 and about 29% in 2021.
This compares to construction contracts that are typically financed through loans provided by Chinese financial institutions and/or contractors with the project often receiving guarantees through the host country’s government institutions potentially backed up by resources (e.g., oil, gas)
The average deal size for investments with a value larger than USD 100 million shrank from USD 772 million in 2023 to USD 672 million in 2024. This is above average for the past 10 years.
For construction projects, the average deal size in 2024 increased due to some very large deals (e.g., USD billion oil refinery deal in Iraq) stable and increased slightly to USD 498 million, up from USD 394 in 2023.
Particularly for construction projects, this trend is bucking the ambition to have “small yet beautiful projects” in the BRI propagated through official channels. However, it is important to note (as seen later in the report) that most large infrastructure projects are resource-backed deals (e.g., oil, gas) rather than fiscal spending deals (e.g., road construction).
Chinese BRI engagement was not evenly distributed among all regions. While China expanded construction engagement across all regions except South Asia (minus 64 per cent), particularly the Pacific saw a 228 per cent increase in Chinese construction contracts—albeit from a low starting point. The region saw no significant investment from China.
Meanwhile, an increase of 102 per cent in construction engagement in the Middle East catapulted the region to become China’s most important partner in 2024 with a total engagement of about USD 39 billion. In consequence, Africa as a continent dropped to second place with USD 29.2 billion in engagement, a growth of 34 per cent of China’s total engagement.
Despite relatively slow growth for China’s engagement in Southeast Asia by only 7 per cent, total engagement reached USD 25.1 billion.
East Asian BRI countries, meanwhile, significantly expanded their intake of Chinese construction engagement and now constitute 3.67 per cent of Chinese total construction engagements.
Latin American BRI countries saw their lowest Chinese engagement in almost 10 years—with significant drops in Chinese investments (and small growth in construction engagement in 2024).
China’s financing and investment spread across 87 BRI countries in 2024 (up from 79 in 2023), with 53 countries receiving investments and 72 with construction engagement.
The country with the highest construction volume in 2024 was Saudi Arabia, with about USD 18.9 billion (up from 5.9 billion in 2023), followed by Iraq (USD 9 billion) United Arab Emirates (USD 3.1 billion), and Liberia (about USD 3 billion).
Regarding BRI investments, Indonesia was again the single largest recipient with about USD 9.3 billion in investments, followed Saudi Arabia (USD 5.8 billion), and Kazakhstan (USD 4.6 billion).
11 countries saw a 100 per cent drop in BRI engagement compared to 2023, including Cote D’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Armenia, and Jordan. China’s engagement in Pakistan for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) dropped by 40 per cent, after dropping about 74 per cent in the previous period (see China’s financing and investment spread across 87 BRI countries in 2024 (up from 79 in 2023), with 53 countries receiving investments and 72 with construction engagement.
The countries with the largest growth of BRI engagement were Guinea (+1,935 per cent), Liberia (+1,900 per cent), the Republic of Congo (+1,800 per cent), Iraq (+799 per cent), and Morocco (+724 per cent). While in 2022, the year of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia did not receive any Chinese engagement, China’s engagement in the country remained low at about USD 212 million.
In 2024, particularly the energy sector (+USD 11.5 billion), the technology sector (+USD 5 billion) and metals & mining (+2 billion) grew compared to 2023.
The focus of China’s overseas BRI engagement continued to be on energy (33 per cent). Compared to the early years of the BRI, the transport sector dropped to its lowest level of only 12 per cent share of BRI engagement. Meanwhile, the mining sector remained the second largest sector with about 17.6 per cent (albeit lower than the 21 per cent of Chinese overseas engagement in 2023) and the technology sector continued to expand.
When comparing construction and investment in different sectors, it becomes clear that in mining and technology, Chinese firms are increasingly prioritising equity investments, despite the higher risks involved; meanwhile, energy investments continue to be dominated by construction deals rather than equity-based investments.
Technology and manufacturing have emerged as key growth sectors, with Chinese engagement in BRI countries exceeding USD 30 billion. The investment is mainly focused on EV batteries and EV manufacturing, as well as a significant expansion of solar PV manufacturing (see Figure 8.). Notable engagements include investments into electric vehicles, such as battery production with BYD’s 1.3 billion production facility in Indonesia, and Gotion’s USD 1.3 billion investment in Slovakia (together with Slovak partner InoBat). Outside of the BRI, Spain received about USD 3.2 billion in hydrogen-related investments.
Another important growth sector of strategic importance to China is metals and mining, where China’s engagement reached a record-high of USD 21.4 billion in 2024, an increase of 10 per cent compared to 2023. Various minerals and metals are particularly relevant to the green transition and batteries for electric vehicles (e.g., nickel, lithium). Engagement has been strong in various African countries, Bolivia, Chile, Latin America and Indonesia. China already holds significant shares of global mining sources (e.g., over 80 per cent of global graphite resources), and even more control in material processing (where across lithium, nickel, cobalt and graphite, China owns more than 50 per cent of global capacity).
Energy-related engagement in the BRI at low levels but with green growth including transmission
China’s energy–related engagement in 2024 again set a record as the greenest since the BRI’s inception in 2013: in 2024, China’s green (solar, wind, waste-to-energy) energy engagement was about USD 11.8 billion, about 30 per cent of China’s total energy engagement, plus an additional USD639 million in hydropower.
China’s engagement in the energy sector represents the largest share of its total BRI engagement. In 2024, total engagement in the energy sector approached USD 40 billion, the highest level since 2017.
Two developments stand out: first, China’s engagement in green energy (solar, wind and biomass) reached a record of USD 11.8 billion (excluding solar equipment exports).
Second, China maintained a continued engagement in fossil fuels, particularly gas, but also coal (through coal mining). Also, engagement in distribution systems (e.g., substations, power lines) constituted more than 11 per cent of Chinese BRI energy engagement.
Following China’s announcement in September 2021 not to build new coal-fired power plants, select new coal-fired power projects seem to be progressing (e.g., Bangladesh Barisal 2, Gacko II in Bosnia).
While no new coal plants with Chinese participation had been announced since 2021, 2024 saw a resurgence in coal-related engagement through mining operations. PowerChina was engaged in several projects in Mongolia and Bangladesh (through construction contracts) and Zhejiang Energy bought stock in an Indonesian coal mine.
Oil and gas engagement rose significantly to USD 24.3 billion (up from USD 15.7 billion in 2023), constituting 62 per cent of Chinese overseas energy engagement, USD 10.8 billion in gas and USD 13.5 billion in oil.
A major deal was the USD 8 billion engagement by China National Chemical Engineering in Iraq to build an oil refinery, which was approved in May 2024.
Oil-related investments increased from zero in 2023 to USD 1.8 billion through Sinopec’s buyout of Samsung in the refinery projects Tecnicas Reunidas in cooperation with Tecnicas Reunidas in Algeria.
China’s total engagement in green energy (solar and wind) and hydropower reached approximately USD11.8 billion in 2024, up from USD9.5 billion in 2023 (see Figure 10).
Looking at investment only, Chinese green energy and hydropower investment increased to USD1.8 billion in 2024 from USD1.1 billion in 2023.
Meanwhile, construction projects related to green energy (excluding hydropower) increased from USD6.4 billion in 2023 to USD10 billion in 2024.
In 2024, a more detailed analysis of green energy sources revealed that China is engaging in a diverse range of renewable energy projects. While solar (46 per cent) and wind (34 per cent) remain the most significant, waste-to-energy projects play a notable role (7.34 per cent of all green energy projects), and energy storage is becoming increasingly important.
Since 2022, China’s engagement across the energy supply chain has evolved significantly. While energy generation remained the primary focus in both 2022 and 2023, 2024 saw a resurgence of fossil fuel processing facilities (USD 17.1 billion) and pipeline projects (USD 4.6 billion). Meanwhile, energy transmission, which is crucial for the green transition, has declined sharply from USD 7.4 billion in 2023 to under USD 500 million.
Transport-related engagement has long been a cornerstone of facilitating trade between China and the BRI countries, and trade is a core component of the BRI. To support this, China has invested in and developed projects in road, rail, aviation, shipping, and logistics across the world (see Figure 15). Overall, China’s engagement in transport-related projects remained stable at about USD 15 billion (despite a decreasing share due to overall larger volumes)—almost exclusively through construction contracts. This figure represents about half the volume seen during the peak years of 2018 and 2019,
Aviation: Two projects were announced totalling USD 175 million, including the expansion of the Konstantin Veliki Airport in Nis, Serbia and an expansion of the concourse at Riyhad Airport in Saudi Arabia.
Total rail engagement (including light rail and subway) was worth USD 9.6 billion. Most of the volume is one subway construction contract worth USD 5.6 billion in Saudi Arabia, as well as some smaller contracts in Singapore and Serbia. Another noteworthy project is an agreement on the tram project in Malaysia.
China continues to engage in road construction projects across multiple BRI countries, with a total value of USD 3.1 billion in 2024. However, this marks the lowest volume of road-related engagement in BRI history. Examples include a highway in Cameroon worth about USD 540 million.
In the shipping and port sector, several investments were announced in 2024, such as an agreement with Tanzania to construct petroleum storage and the acquisition of a 51 per cent stake in Singapore’s NPH by China Merchant Group.
In 2024, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) reclaimed a more dominant role compared to private enterprises, reversing the trend of recent years.
For investment projects, Sinopec, China’s energy SOE, led ahead of PT Shengwei New Energy (a private company).
The Chinese companies most prominently featured in construction projects in the BRI in 2024 was PowerChina (again), followed by China National Chemical Engineering and China Petroleum and Chemical (Sinopec). This development for construction projects is in line with last years’ trends.
All foreign direct investments (FDI) to developing countries fell to USD 854 billion, a drop of 2 per cent in 2024, marking the second year of decline, according to UNCTAD’s Global Investment Trends Monitor, published in January 2025.
Investments in SDG-related projects (e.g., agrifood, water, sanitation) fell 11 per cent globally in 2024.
Particularly developing countries in Asia (including China) saw a steep decline in FDI, registering a 7 per cent drop to USD 588 billion, as well as FDI into Latin America and the Caribbean (minus 9 per cent). FDI into Africa, meanwhile, grew by 86 per cent to USD 94 billion.
In Asia, particularly China saw a 29 per cent decline in foreign direct investments, whereas India posted a 13 per cent increase. Similarly, ASEAN economies saw a 2 per cent increase in FDI. Greenfield investments picked up in Brazil, Argentina and Colombia despite overall weak performance.
African economies saw strong growth mostly due to a large project in Egypt worth over USD 40 billion.
Worrisome is the continued decline (31 per cent) in international project finance deals.
Looking ahead, UNCTAD expects a moderate increase in FDI flows in 2025 with moderate inflation and tempered borrowing costs. However, geopolitical risks and high debt levels remain a concern for global FDI flows, particularly with high uncertainty about the US trade and investment politics.
Chinese finance and investments in the Belt and Road Initiative countries in 2024 have accelerated significantly.
For 2025, a further expansion of BRI investments and construction contracts seems possible. On the one hand, there is a clear need for investments to green boost growth to support the green transition both in China and in BRI countries. This provides continued opportunities for mining and minerals processing deals, technology deals (e.g., EV manufacturing, battery manufacturing) and green energy (e.g., energy production and transmission). China refers to these industries (electric vehicles, batteries and renewable energy) as the “New Three”.
Furthermore, global trade volatilities and uncertainties can spur investments in supply chain resilience and exploration of new markets by Chinese companies. However, risks emerge due to uncertainty of possible activities by global financial institutions with strong US board presence (e.g., World Bank Group, Asian Development Bank), while China-dominated development banks (e.g., AIIB, NDB) should provide infrastructure development opportunities for Chinese contractors.
We do expect Chinese BRI engagement to reach similar levels in 2025 as in 2024. Part of this expectation is driven by the growing need of China’s domestic players to invest abroad to seek opportunities in other countries.
In line with our previous predictions, we continue to see deal numbers increasing. With strong engagement in sectors requiring significant investment (e.g., mining, manufacturing), compared to sectors with variable engagement (e.g., renewable energy), we can expect deal size to remain larger than in 2022 and 2023 and possibly compared to 2024.
By Christop Nedopil for the Griffith Institute (Australia).
